We analyse the post-issue operating performance of 304 venture-backed and 264 nonventure UK IPOs 1985-2000. The full sample exhibits a significant operational decline five years post issue. While this is mainly driven by non-venture IPOs, the difference between these and venture-backed IPOs is statistically insignificant. Crosssection regression results indicate a significantly positive relationship between venture capitalist certification and operating performance 1985-1997 but not during the 1998-2000 bubble. Operating declines cluster in the latter period which features a significantly negative relationship between initial returns and post-IPO operating results. These findings point to market timing in the bubble years.
Introduction
Researchers have documented a long-run decline in companies' post-IPO operating performance in various advanced economies. Jain and Kini (1994) and (1995), Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) provide evidence for the USA, Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) for Italy, Khurshed, Paleari and Vismara (2003) for the UK, and Cai and Wei (1997) and Kutsuna, Okamura, and Cowling (2002) for Japan.
1 All of these studies find that IPO firms exhibit a decrease in operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated by assets relative to their pre-IPO levels. However, only Jain and Kini (1995) specifically examine the role of venture capitalists (VC) in this context. To our knowledge, ours is the first study of the post-issue operating performance of a unique sample of some 568 venture-backed and non-venture IPOs in the UK.
2
The long-run decline in companies' post-IPO operating performance should not come as a great surprise since long run IPO investment or stock market performance also displays a similar trajectory. Simplifying somewhat, two broad explanations for operating underperformance can be discerned. On one hand, the classical approach stresses the presence of information asymmetries based on reduced management ownership post IPO. This leads to increased agency costs in the spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and a subsequent focus on non-value maximising projects. On the other hand, behavioral approaches posit that underperformance can be explained by market timing by entrepreneurs or venture capitalists. Examples of this include the windows of opportunity theory of capital structure of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the market timing theory of capital structure of Baker and Wurgler (2002) even if the latter is not specifically developed for IPO markets. Related to these is the notion that window-dressing of accounting numbers leads to an overstatement of pre-IPO operating levels and understatement of post-IPO operating levels. For instance, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) find evidence of such behaviour in relation to the accounting treatment of accruals.
Conflicts of interest between various interest groups are inherent in both approaches. Classical approaches such as that of Jain and Kini (1995) argue that the certification role of venture capitalists is crucial in alleviating such conflicts of 1 See also Wang, Wang, and Lu (2003) for a study of IPOs in Singapore. 2 While Khurshed et al. (2003) is the first study of the operating performance of UK IPOs, their sample does not distinguish between venture-and non-venture IPOs.
interest. They report that venture-backed IPOs generate superior post-IPO performance relative to non-venture IPOs. Furthermore, they find that proxies for the quality of venture capitalist involvement impact positively on post-issue operating performance. By contrast, behavioural finance researchers argue that such conflicts come to the fore during particular periods such as the recent bubble period years.
Issuers then use market timing to take advantage of the prevailing market sentiment.
This paper contributes to the above debate by analysing operating performance using a relatively large non-US dataset. 3 We employ a sample of some 568 IPOs in the UK, the most developed international capital market after the US. More specifically, our sample comprises some 304 venture-backed and 264 non-venture
IPOs issued on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the course of the [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] period. This differs substantially from that used by Khurshed, Paleari and Vismara (2003) in their study of the operating performance of a sample of UK IPOs both from the LSE and the Alternative Investment Market for the sample period 1994-1999. 4 Furthermore, we undertake detailed tests of behavioural as well as classical hypotheses across cohort years, industry sectors and various capital market sorts in seeking to understand the underlying causes for the long-term operating decline post-
IPO.
The results show significant operating declines five years post-IPO relative to the pre-issue year for the overall sample. This finding confirms the UK operating underperformance puzzle found by Khurshed, Paleari and Vismara (2003) for the 1995-1999 sample period. Industry analysis reveals that significant underperformance is present only in the high-technology sector for the overall sample and both venturebacked and non-venture samples. These findings are consistent with the view that poor-quality IPOs were taken public in this sector which subsequently suffered a sharp fall in operating cash flow over assets. Cross-section regression results support this view.
The second contribution of this paper is that our sample enables us to focus on any potential performance differential between venture-backed and non-venture IPOs and to shed light on the specific role of venture capitalists in relation to post-issue operating returns. In this manner the paper seeks to build on the existing US findings of Jain and Kini (1995) . Significant operational declines are found for the non-venture IPO sample but not for the venture-backed IPOs. However, contrary to the Jain and Kini (1995) findings, the operating performance differential between venture-backed and non-venture IPOs is virtually never significant for our UK sample.
Cross-section regression results confirm the positive impact of VC involvement overall on post-IPO operating performance. VC variables, such as their pre-IPO stake and their funds under management pre-IPO show a significantly positive impact on post-IPO operating returns. However, the results indicate that VC reputation actually has a negative impact on post-IPO operating performance which is consistent with Lerner's (1994b) VC market-timing hypothesis. He shows that experienced venture capitalists are more proficient in bringing companies to market at times they perceive to be optimal compared to their less reputable colleagues. The Lerner hypothesis is borne out by the finding that VC certification is found to be significant during the normal (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) period but not during the bubble (1998) (1999) (2000) years. This is consistent with the model by Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2004) which predicts that entrepreneurs are willing to take companies public when their cash flows are at a relative peak.
The final contribution of this paper is to add to the recent literature on the bubble period and behavioural attempts to explain the events through the role of investor sentiment. We establish that significant underperformance is concentrated in the bubble period of 1998-2000. 
Operating performance, venture capital and timing of IPOs
The puzzling decline in operating performance post-IPO has been extensively documented in the literature. For example, Jain and Kini (1994) use a sample of 2,125
US IPOs from 1976 to 1988 and report that firms going public exhibit a substantial decline in post-issue operating performance. Specifically, the performance of IPO firms declines significantly relative to its pre-IPO levels over the period extending from the year prior to the IPO until five years after the offering. This result holds irrespective of whether performance is based on their operating return on assets or on operating cash flows where both are deflated by assets.
These empirical findings have subsequently been replicated. For instance, they are confirmed by Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) in the US and by Khurshed, Paleari and Vismara (2003) Jain and Kini (1995) find dramatic declines in operating performance for both venture and non-venture IPOs relative to their pre-IPO levels, with the decline being significantly deeper for the latter group. Similarly, the venture-backed group demonstrates relatively superior performance in terms of the operating return on assets in each post-issue year relative to the pre-IPO year. Cross-section regression analysis confirms that venture capital participation and higher quality venture capital monitoring leads to improved performance. In addition, Jain and Kini show that the capital market recognises the value of venture capitalist monitoring which is reflected in the higher levels of market-to-book and P/E ratios at the time of the offering. The results are interpreted as supporting the contention that venture capitalists are able to take issuers public at higher P/E ratios. These findings can, however, also be interpreted in line with Lerner's (1994b) argument that venture capitalists are highly proficient at timing the IPO market and of taking advantage of windows of opportunities as proposed by Loughran and Ritter (1995) . 6 Brav and Gompers (1997) extend the debate and confirm the findings on IPO timing in general which was first highlighted by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) . They compute yearly cohort results and find that years of greatest IPO activity are associated with the most severe underperformance. Benninga et al. (2004) similarly show that IPOs appear to cluster during periods in which investors place relatively high values on the cash flows of the firms that go public. Draho (2001) argues that the recent frenzy over internet-related IPOs was a direct consequence of the sharp increase in the valuation of the companies prior to and during the frenzy. Those venture capitalists with a reputation index value greater than the average are classified as having an established reputation (see Lin and Smith (1998) ).
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Post-issue operating data was sourced from the Hambro Companies Guide and issuer accounts. Delisting data are from the London Stock Exchange Yearbooks. The offering and closing prices on the first day of trading, market value at IPO and postissue were taken from Datastream which was also used to cross-reference post-issue operating data and delisting information.
Methodology
The operating performance of IPOs is measured from the fiscal year before the IPO until five years post-IPO using the median as the standard measure in line with the existing literature. 13 The median change is computed for less than five years post-IPO for some companies due to lack of data as a consequence of delistings and the fact that accounting data were only collected until December 31, 2002. 14 Throughout the paper, operating performance is calculated using the ratio of operating cash flow deflated by total assets.
15 Clementi (2002) states that the operating cash flow deflated by total assets ratio is less vulnerable to accounting manipulation than for example operating return on assets. Operating return on assets is potentially subject to artificial earnings inflations in the years prior to the IPO when using discretionary accruals adjustments as shown by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) . Clementi argues however that the dramatic decline in operating performance post-IPO reported in the literature is not consistent with the 12 The index value is calculated as follows: Index of lead venture capitalist reputation = 0.5*(Age of lead venture capitalist -Mean age)/ age + 0.5*(Number of deals as lead by lead venture capitalist -Mean number of deals as lead)/ deals 13 See for example Jain and Kini (1994) , Mikkelson et al. (1997) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) . 14 For the overall sample, about 30% of companies delist within five years of their IPO. See Kini (1999, 2000) for survival rates of IPO firms in the US. 15 The operating cash flow is defined as the operating income less capital expenditure, where operating income equals net sales less cost of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses before depreciation, depletion and amortisation. See Kini (1994, 1995) , Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) for a similar approach.
above creative accounting explanation which should lead to smooth declines post IPO in order to avoid legal action against the management. He thus concludes that the decline in measures of operating performance is a genuine reflection of decreasing profitability.
The change in operating performance is measured as its median change. For example, the variable [Operating cash flows on assets, (t) -Operating cash flows on assets, (-1)] represents the increase in operating cash flows on assets for a firm measured over a time-window starting one year prior to IPO to t fiscal years after the IPO. All reported significance tests are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test of the null that the changes are zero. Furthermore, Z-statistics are computed to conduct
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests of the null hypothesis that the distribution of operating performance is identical for venture-backed and non-venture IPOs. operating performance compared to a control sample of non-venture IPOs.
Hypotheses

Hypothesis 3
H 0 : Venture-backed IPOs generate superior post-IPO operating performance compared to non-venture IPOs.
H 1 : There is no difference in post-IPO operating performance between venture and non-venture IPO performance.
(iv) High technology sector
A large proportion of the high-technology IPOs in our sample went public during the 1998-2000 period. This is a period when investor enthusiasm for the internet in particular was at its height, as documented inter alia by Ofek and Richardson (2002) for the US. 17 They show that a significantly larger proportion of investors in internet stocks consisted of individuals rather than institutions, making the market increasingly prone to behavioural biases that lead to overly optimistic beliefs. Ofek and Richardson develop a framework in the spirit of Miller (1977) arguing that irrationally exuberant investors overwhelmed the market with their unrealistically high valuations, in particular in the high-technology sector. Thus high-technology
IPOs should exhibit significant post-issue operating performance declines.
Hypothesis 4
H 0 : Post-issue operating performance is the same across industry sectors.
H 1 : Post-issue operating performance is poorer in the high technology sector.
(v) Venture capital variables
Megginson and Weiss (1991) first formulated the classical VC certification hypothesis that, due to asymmetric information, venture capitalists function as certifying agents to the issuing firms. This has been supported in various guises by many researchers. Barry et al. (1990) show that venture capitalists exercise strong controls over their portfolio companies, mainly due to large block shareholdings and active participation in the board of directors. Lerner (1994a) demonstrates that syndication among venture capitalists may lead to a superior selection of investments, by bringing together more expertise, support and access to capital. Gompers (1996) cites industry wisdom that established venture capitalists with long track records can quickly and easily raise large funds. Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that reputable venture capitalists provide access to top-tier investment and commercial bankers, participate on the board of directors and implement superior management structures.
Hypothesis 5
H 1 : There is a positive relationship between the reputation and involvement of the venture capitalists pre-IPO in the issuing firm and its long run post-IPO operating performance.
H 1 : There is no significant relationship in this case.
(vi) Impact of underpricing
Based on the signalling theories of Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) , Jain and Kini (1994) conjecture that low-value firms are unlikely to incur the cost of underpricing in order to look like high-value firms. This is because the true firm value is likely to be revealed at the time of assumed secondary offerings shortly after the IPO. In the resulting separating equilibrium, only high-value firms underprice at the offering. Assuming that post-IPO operating performance proxies for unobservable firm quality at the time of the offering, the signalling models of underpricing predict that IPO firms that underprice should exhibit superior operating performance compared to those that do not.
Alternatively, behavioural finance theories view the role of underpricing in a rather different light. For instance, high underpricing is taken as a signal of investor exuberance in behavioural contributions such as that of Krigman, Shah and Womack (1999) . In the context of models such as theirs, higher initial returns foreshadow declines in operating performance.
Hypothesis 6
H 0 : There is a positive relationship between underpricing of the IPO and its post-IPO operating performance.
There is a negative relationship between underpricing of the IPO and its post-IPO operating performance.
(vii) Pre-IPO earnings quality Ljungqvist et al. (2004) conjecture in their Prediction No 6 that lower-quality companies go public for opportunistic reasons in hot IPO markets. This results in a decline in the quality of the average issuer and particularly in its earnings deflated by total assets. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) show that some 62% of firms listing in the US in 1997 had 12-month track records of earnings while this had fallen to just 23.6% in 1999. It thus follows that the poor pre-IPO performance of low quality companies going public in bubble periods or hot markets will be reflected in inferior long-term post-IPO operating performance.
Hypothesis 7
H 0 : There is no relationship between pre-IPO earnings (turnover) growth deflated by assets and post-issue operating performance.
H 1 : There is a positive relationship between pre-IPO earnings (turnover) growth deflated by assets and post-issue operating performance. The latter usually are large, highly cash generative businesses that involve relatively high levels of debt in order to increase the equity returns of the venture capitalists. Jain and Kini (1995) , however, find no significant differences in prior year total assets between venture-backed and non-venture IPOs. 19 Jain and Kini (1995) , however, find that venture-backed IPOs have significantly lower operating return on assets and operating cash flows over assets compared to non-venture IPOs in the year prior to the IPO. Furthermore, they find that venture-backed IPOs have significantly larger median capital expenditures over book value of total assets compared to non-venture floats.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics of pre-IPO operating performance levels
performance levels are not significantly different between venture-backed and nonventure IPOs. Table 2 reports the results on the median change in operating cash flow deflated by total assets from the fiscal year prior to the IPO to five years post-IPO by cohort year.
Operating performance change by cohort year
[ Table 2 around here]
The first three columns show the number of IPOs between 1985 and 2000 both for the full sample and then separately for venture-backed and non-venture IPOs. The next three columns report the median change in operating cash flow deflated by total assets for these three categories of IPOs and the last column reports the significance tests for difference in medians between venture and non-venture IPOs.
The number of IPOs has been highly variable over the sample period.
Particularly noticeable is the relatively large number of IPOs during the mid-1990s
and 2000 and the relative scarcity of offerings pre 1993. The null in Hypothesis 1 is that IPOs do not exhibit significant operating declines relative to the pre-IPO year. For the venture-backed sample, the overall underperformance of -0.11% after five years is not significantly different from zero. By contrast, the underperformance of -2.95% for non-venture IPOs is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that IPO operating decline is mainly a non-venture phenomenon in the UK. Contrary to Hypothesis 3 and Jain and Kini (1995) , the performance differential between venturebacked and non-venture IPOs is almost never significant. Indeed, there is a significant difference in operating performance between venture and non-venture IPOs only in three years : 1987, 1989 and 1996. 22 Hypothesis 3 thus can be rejected for the overall sample excluding these exceptions.
Venture-backed IPOs show significant increases in post-IPO operating performance only in 3 years, 1985, 1989 and 1992. However, they experience sharp declines in operating performance of -9.65% and -26.38% in 1998 and 2000 that are significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. Non-venture IPO operating performance is significant only in 1999 and 2000 with figures of -6.97% and -9.56%
which are significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. We conclude that both types of IPOs issued during the bubble period of 1998-2000 exhibit sharp decreases in operating cash flows over assets, contrary to Hypothesis 2. Table 2 since most high-technology IPOs were floated during the 1998-2000 bubble period.
Operating performance by industry
The Table reveals significant declines at the 5% level for both venture-backed and non-venture IPOs of some -4.85% and -4.49%, respectively, in the hightechnology sector. Non-venture IPOs also exhibit significant decreases in operating cash flows over assets in the industry sector, with a fall of -4.01% five years post-IPO relative to the pre-IPO year. This is the only sector in which non-venture IPOs perform significantly worse than venture-backed companies at the 10% level of significance.
IPOs in the telecom/IT sector experienced the sharpest decline of some -39% in median operating performance for the full sample. This is statistically significant at the 1% level. Other high-technology sub-sectors that declined significantly include health/pharmaceuticals with -8.12% (significant at 10% level) and media/photography with a fall of -1.82% (significant at the 5% level). By contrast, IPOs in the electronic/electrical equipment sector showed a significant operating performance improvement of 7.00% for the full sample at the 1% level.
These results are mirrored when looking separately at venture-backed and nonventure companies. Venture-backed IPOs experienced steep operating declines of some -34.74% and -26.03% in the telecom/IT and health/ pharmaceuticals subsectors that are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Non-venture IPOs in the telecom/IT sub-sector also declined dramatically by -46.24% which is significant at the 1% level. 24 The evidence so far conforms to the Ljungqvist et al. (2004) view that poor-quality IPOs, both venture-backed and non-venture, were taken public during the 1998-2000 bubble period in the telecom and IT sector which subsequently suffered considerable decreases in operating cash flow over assets.
Operating performance by capital market and operational variables
The results of univariate analysis of operating performance using capital market and operatiional sorts are presented in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 around here]
The simple sorts include prestigious versus non-prestigious underwriter, high versus low initial return, old versus young issuing firm, high versus low market capitalisation or gross proceeds, high versus low revenues, profitability or net assets three years pre-IPO. The median cut-off points were recalculated separately for the whole sample, and for venture-backed and non-venture IPOs to take into account sample variation.
The full sample column presents a number of interesting trends with only one of the sorts in each category showing significant declines in operating performance.
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For example, IPOs sponsored by low-prestige underwriters, as defined by annual
Hambro underwriter rankings, and young IPOs generate significant declines in operating performance at the 5% and 1% levels with figures of -2.98% and -2.92%, respectively.
Interestingly, companies with lower revenues and profitability (using operating profit deflated by total assets as the profitability measure) in the three years pre-IPO 24 The health/pharmaceuticals sub-sector was the only one with significantly different performance between venture-backed and non-venture IPOs. In that case, venture-backed IPOs performed significantly worse compared to non-venture IPOs at the 10% level. 25 The raw initial return and net assets/liabilities sorts are the only ones for the full sample of IPOs where both IPOs with high and low sorts failed to generate significant declines in operating performance.
experience significantly worse operating performance of -6.06% and -3.49%, respectively, both significant at 1%. This can be interpreted as lower quality companies performing worse post-IPO and the split into venture-backed and nonventure IPOs sheds further light on this. Only venture-backed companies with belowmedian revenues and net assets/liabilities pre-IPO generated significant decline postissue. These posted falls of -4.98% and -4.90 that are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All categories of non-venture IPOs show significant declines in operating performance for one of the two sorts. Similar to the overall sample, IPOs sponsored by low-prestige underwriters and those that are younger indicate post-issue operating declines of -4.01% and -4.29%, respectively, that are both significant at 1% level.
Likewise, companies with weaker pre-IPO performance show significant declines whether using revenues, profitability or net assets/liabilities. Contrary to results found for the overall sample, non-venture IPOs exhibit significantly worse operating returns when they are smaller and issue less proceeds, at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Finally, non-venture IPOs with high raw initial returns show decreases in operating cash flows over assets of -3.49% post-IPO, that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Venture-backed IPOs with high initial returns and low net assets/liabilities outperform non-venture IPOs at the 1% levels while those with low market cap and proceeds outperform non-venture IPOs at the 10% level.
Regression results
Regression variables
The results of tests of hypotheses 4-7 in a cross-section regression framework are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . The estimation method is ordinary least squares and tstatistics calculated using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. The dependent variable in all specifications is the change in operating cash flows deflated by total assets from the fiscal year preceding the IPO up to five year after the IPO.
Hypothesis 5 is examined using a number of proxies for venture capital involvement and reputation. The VC variable is a dummy for venture-capital Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry et al. (1990) and include the number of venture capitalists holding equity stakes at the IPO (NOVC), the aggregate venture capitalist equity stake before the IPO (VCSTAKE0) and a dummy variable coded 1 if there is a venture capitalist on the board at the time of IPO (DIR). As stated above, a positive relationship is expected between these variables and IPO operating performance according to Hypothesis 5.
The FIRST DAY RETURN variable is the raw return on the first day of trading.
This variable is used in tests of the signalling theories behind Jain and Kini's (1994) hypothesis that predicts that companies with higher underpricing signal better post-IPO operating performance in line with Hypothesis 6. The alternative views high underpricing as a signal of investor exuberance and thus predicts that higher initial returns foreshadow substantial declines in operating performance. individual industries. The SERVICES dummy captures distributors and retailers, leisure, restaurants and transport as well as support services. The HIGH-TECH dummy includes electronic and electrical equipment, health and pharmaceuticals, media and photography as well as telecom, IT hardware and software. Table 5 reports the results of the operating performance regressions for the full sample. The first specification uses the VC dummy for testing Hypothesis 5 while the second specification uses separate proxies for VC involvement. Table 6 reports the results of the same approach applied separately to the 1985-1997 and 1998-2000 samples, to analyse better the effect of the internet bubble period on post-IPO operating cash flows deflated by total assets.
Cross-section regression results
27
[ Table 5 around here]
In the first specification using the full sample of 568 IPOs, the coefficient on the VC dummy is significantly positive at the 5% level. Thus Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected.
The coefficient on the initial return variable is significantly negative at the 5% level and so we reject Hypothesis 6. This is a novel finding as neither Jain and Kini (1994) nor, more recently, Khurshed et al. (2003) manage to find any significant relationship between underpricing and post-issue operating performance. However, our results are consistent with findings by Krigman et al. (1999) that show that IPOs with high initial returns are likely to be affected by investor sentiment and thus can foreshadow operating underperformance post-issue. Interestingly, these findings link with the fact that the coefficient on the high-technology variable is also significantly negative at the 5% level and so we can reject Hypothesis 4.
The coefficients on all the previous variables continue to be significant in the second specification. Those of the pre-IPO stake held by venture capitalists and their funds under management pre-IPO show a significantly positive impact on post-IPO operating returns at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, in line with Hypothesis 5.
However, the VCREP variable coefficient is significantly negative at the 10% level, suggesting a negative impact of venture capital reputation on post-IPO operating performance. While this rejects Hypothesis 5, we note that it is consistent with 27 A number of other regression specifications were tested, but none of those were significant or produced significant results.
Lerner's (1994b) venture capitalist market-timing hypothesis that more reputable venture capitalists are successful at timing IPOs. Table 6 reports the separate results for the 1985-1997 and 1998-2000 periods.
[ Table 6 around here]
We initially summarise the results from the first specification for the [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] period. 28 The venture capital dummy coefficient is significantly positive at the 5% level supporting Hypothesis 5. However, none of the coefficients of the other pre-IPO operating or industry-related variables is statistically significant apart from that on the AGE variable. The second specification for the same period shows that the coefficients of the pre-IPO venture capitalist stake and funds under management both are significantly positive at the 5% level supporting Hypothesis 5.
The coefficient of determination increases sharply to 26.4% and 27.6% in specifications three and four, respectively, for the 1998-2000 sample period.
Interestingly, the positive VC impact during the 1985-1997 period is not in evidence now. Indeed, none of coefficients of the venture-capital related variables is now significant in these two specifications. This rejects Hypothesis 5 and VC certification for the 1998-2000 period.
The EBIT/ASSETS variable coefficient is significantly positive in both specifications at the 1% level and this rejects Hypothesis 7. This is consistent with pre-IPO, poorly performing companies continuing to perform poorly afterwards. The initial return variable coefficient is significantly negative at the 10% and 5% levels, for specifications 3 and 4, respectively, while the coefficient of the high-technology variable is significantly negative at the 10% level in specification 4. These results reject Hypotheses 6 and 4. They point towards investor sentiment impacting on IPOs with high initial returns and in the high-tech sectors whose post-issue operating performance crashed.
Conclusions
This in operating performance five years after the offering compared to the pre-IPO year.
These results confirm the operating underperformance puzzle for the UK market and the earlier findings of Khurshed et al. (2003) over the shorter 1994-1999 period.
We find that operating underperformance is significant for non- venture prediction that entrepreneurs undertake IPOs only when operating performance is about to deteriorate. We conclude that the bubble years point to the influence of both market timing and investor sentiment on long run operating performance. Median change in operating cash flow deflated by total assets is from the fiscal year preceding the IPO up to five years after the IPO. Operating cash flows are defined as operating income less capital expenditures. The median change is measured for less than five years for some companies due to lack of data as a consequence prior to the IPO. The profitability measure is operating income divided by total assets. Issuer incorporation data are from London Stock Exchange Yearbook. Accounting data is from the prospectus, Hambro Company Guide and issuer accounts. The significance tests for the change rates are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test and test that change rates are different from zero. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance, at the 10%, 5% and 1% level or better, respectively. All pound values are in 2002 prices. The median change is measured for less than five years for some companies due to lack of delistings and the fact that accounting data was only collected until 31 December 2002. High-prestige underwriters are those listed in the top-ten in annual Hambro underwriter rankings. The raw initial return is the initial IPO return. Age is in months from incorporation to IPO date. Market capitalisation is defined as market price at IPO times number of shares outstanding. Nominal gross proceeds are defined as offer price times shares sold to the public, excluding overallotments. The revenues, profitability and net assets are measured for up to 36-month period The dependent variable is the change in operating cash flow deflated by total assets from the fiscal year preceding the IPO up to five years after the IPO, expressed as a percentage. VC is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the IPO was venture-backed and zero otherwise. AGE is the natural logarithm of the age of the issuer at IPO. The natural logarithm of market capitalisation (MARKETCAP) controls for size. The UNDERWRITER dummy variable equals 1 if the IPO's lead underwriter is listed in the topten in annual Hambro underwriter rankings. The VCREP dummy variable equals 1 if the IPO's lead venture capitalist has an established reputation as defined previously. NOVC is the number of venture capitalists holding equity stakes at the IPO. VCSTAKE0 is the aggregate venture capitalist equity stake before the IPO. DIR is a dummy variable coded 1 if there was a venture capitalist on the board at the time of IPO. VCFUND is the natural logarithm of the (average) funds managed by the venture capitalists before the IPO. FIRST DAY RETURN is the raw return on the first day of trading. TURNOVER/ASSETS equals the growth in turnover between up to three years pre-IPO and the fiscal year of the IPO divided by the average total assets in those four years. EBIT/ASSETS equals the growth in EBIT between up to three years pre-IPO and the fiscal year of the IPO divided by the average total assets in those four years. All values are in constant price. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance, at the 10%, 5% and 1% level or better, respectively. The t-statistics (in italics) are calculated using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. 
